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THE MORROW OF THE WAR

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THE FOUR CARDINAL POINTS IN THE POLICY OF THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL ARE AS FOLLOWS

1. No Province shall be transferred from one Government to another without the consent, by plébiscite or otherwise, of the population of such province.

2. No Treaty, Arrangement or Undertaking shall be entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy shall be created.

3. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the "Balance of Power"; but shall be directed to the establishment of a Concert of the Powers and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be public, part of the labour of such Council to be the creation of definite Treaties of Arbitration and the establishment of Courts for their interpretation and enforcement.

4. Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace settlement a plan for the drastic reduction, by consent, of the armaments of all the belligerent Powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the general nationalisation of the manufacture of armaments, and the control of the export of armaments by one country to another.

The Morrow of the War.

OUR PURPOSE.

This country is at war, and has for the moment one overwhelming preoccupation: to render safe our national inheritance.

The Union of Democratic Control has been founded for the purpose of trying to secure for ourselves and the generations that succeed us a new course of policy which will prevent a similar peril ever again befalling our Empire. Many men and women have already joined us holding varying shades of opinion as to the origins of the war. Some think it was inevitable, some that it could and should have been avoided. **But we believe that all are in general agreement about two things: First, it is imperative that the war, once begun, should be prosecuted to a victory for our country. Secondly, it is equally imperative, while we carry on the war, to prepare for peace. Hard thinking, free discussion, the open exchange of opinion and information are the duty of all citizens to-day, if we are to have any hope that this war will not be what most wars of the past have been—merely the prelude to other wars.**

Our contribution to this necessary discussion are the principles put forward for consideration by the Union of Democratic Control.

The Union of Democratic Control has been created to insist that the following policy shall inspire the actual conditions of peace, and shall dominate the situation after peace has been declared:—

1. No Province shall be transferred from one Government to another without consent by plebiscite or otherwise of the population of such Province.

2. No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking shall be entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy shall be created.

3. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the "Balance of Power"; but shall be directed to the establishment of a Concert of the Powers and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be public, part of the labour of such Council to be the creation of definite Treaties of Arbitration and the establishment of Courts for their interpretation and enforcement.

4. Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace settlement a plan for the drastic reduction by consent of the armaments of all the belligerent Powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the general nationalisation of the manufacture of armaments, and the control of the export of armaments by one country to another.

It is the purpose of this pamphlet to elaborate and explain the considerations which underlie the policy outlined above.

I.

No Province shall be transferred from one Government to another without the consent by plébiscite of the population of such province.

This condition has been placed first because if adhered to practically and in spirit, and if recognised by the European Powers as a principle that must guide all frontier rearrangements, it would help to put an end to European war.

If no province were retained under a Government's power against the will of its inhabitants, the policy of conquest and the imposition of political power would lose its *raison d'être*.

The subject as a whole is wrapped up, of course, with the principle of democratic government and is not merely a problem of international but of internal politics, and could not be treated briefly in a mere outline like the present. But anyone who reflects carefully on the subject will see that the peace in Europe ultimately depends upon the acceptance of this idea.

It is obvious that there are many difficulties of detail in its application; that a plébiscite may be a mere form and not reflect the real wishes of the population concerned, and under military control it can be used as an instrument for obtaining an

apparent sanction for oppression, and that in populations of mixed race it is very difficult of application. But it should not be impossible to guard against the defeat of the principle through defects in the working machinery. Plébiscites, where used at the end of the war, might be carried out under international supervision. The essential is that the principle involved should be clearly enunciated.

Fortunately the Government have already given the country a valuable lead in this matter. For Mr. Churchill, speaking on September 11, said:

> Now the war has come, and when it is over let us be careful not to make the same mistake or the same sort of mistake as Germany made when she had France prostrate at her feet in 1870. (Cheers.) Let us, whatever we do, fight for and work towards great and sound principles for the European system, and the first of those principles which we should keep before us is the principle of nationality—that is to say, not the conquest or subjugation of any great community, or of any strong race of men, but the setting free of those races which have been subjugated and conquered; and if doubt arises about disputed areas of country we should try to settle their ultimate destination in the reconstruction of Europe which must follow from this war with a fair regard to the wishes and feelings of the people who live in them.

We agree with Mr. Churchill that the terms of peace should secure that there shall in the future be no more Alsace Lorraines to create during half a century resentment, unrest, and intrigues for a *revanche*. The power of the victorious parties must not be used for vindictive oppression and dismemberment of beaten nationalities, but for the creation, by co-operation with all the belligerents, victors and vanquished alike, of a true society of nations, banded together for mutual security. The future relationship of the States of Europe must be not that of victor and vanquished, domination or subserviency, but of partnership. The struggle of one nation for domination over another must be replaced by the association of the people for their common good.

II.

No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking shall be entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy shall be created.

The peoples of all constitutionally-governed countries are justified in demanding that diplomatic relations with their neighbours shall be conducted with the main object of maintaining friendly international intercourse. The increasing social and economic interdependence, the ramifications of the credit system, the facility and rapidity of intercommunication, the developing community of intellectual interest, the growth of a collective social consciousness, are combining to minimise the significance of the purely political frontiers which divide civilised States. For these reasons the world is moving towards conferences when political difficulties arise as a substitute for war. The determina-

tion to preserve national ideals and traditions offers no real obstacle. But the common interest of civilised democracies cannot be advanced by a secret diplomacy out of touch with democratic sentiment.

The anomaly of such practices in a democratic State has only to be understood to be condemned. All the domestic activities of a constitutional Government are tested in the crucible of public analysis and criticism. But the Government department charged with the supervision of the nation's intercourse with its neighbours, which if wrongly handled may react with ruinous effect upon the whole field of its domestic activities and upon the future of its entire social economy, **not only escapes efficient public control, but considers itself empowered to commit the nation to specific courses and to involve it in obligations to third parties entailing the risk of war, without the nation's knowledge or consent.**

During the past eight years particularly, the management of the Foreign department has become avowedly and frankly autocratic. Parliamentary discussion of foreign policy has become so restricted as to be perfunctory. It is confined to a few hours' roving debate on one day in each session. The eliciting of information by means of questions, never satisfactory, is rendered extremely difficult by the ingenuity employed in evading the issues it is attempted to raise. Advantage has been taken of the wholesome desire that discussion of foreign policy should not partake of mere Party recriminations, to burke discussion altogether, and this process has received the endorsement of both Front Benches. A claim to "continuity" has been further evolved to stifle debate on foreign affairs, whereas in point of fact, if one feature more than another has characterised British foreign policy of recent years, it has been its bewildering fluctuations. Parliamentary paralysis has had its counterpart in the country. The present Government's tenure of office has been marked by an almost complete abstention from public reference to foreign affairs. The public has been treated as though foreign affairs were outside—and properly outside—its ken. And the public has acquiesced. Every attempt to shake its apathy has been violently assailed by spokesmen of the Foreign Office in the Press. The country has been told that its affairs were in the wisest hands, and that mystery and silence are the indispensable attributes to a successful direction of foreign policy. The caste system which prevails in the diplomatic service, and which has survived unimpaired the democratising of the majority of the public services, facilitates these outworn political dogmatisms. Appointment is made by nomination and selection. Candidates are required to possess an income per annum of £400. The natural result is that the vast bulk of the national intelligence is debarred from the diplomatic field of employment. A study of the Foreign Office

list will disclose the fact that over 95 per cent. of the British Diplomatic Staff is composed of members of the aristocracy and landed gentry.

Inevitable exile from their country results in our diplomatic representatives abroad losing touch with the centre of affairs and living in a mental atmosphere remote from the popular and progressive movements of the time. Another pronounced characteristic of the system is the indifference displayed by the Foreign Office to the business interests of the nation. Our vast commercial interests, so intimately affected by our relations with foreign Powers, are regarded as lying outside the orbit of diplomatic considerations. The connection between politics and business—and by business we mean the entire framework of peaceful commerce upon which the prosperity of this country depends—appears to be ignored, or, at least, treated with indifference and something like contempt. The services of our Consuls abroad are not sufficiently utilised, and the Consular machinery requires complete overhauling. Such questions as, for instance, the effect upon British commercial interest of British diplomacy supporting the acquisition of undeveloped areas of the world's surface by a Power like France, which imposes differential tariffs upon British goods, and opposing the acquisition of such areas by a Power like Germany, which admits British goods on terms of equality, does not appear to enter into Foreign Office calculations.

In the last few years also has been added another institution which modifies national policy without coming under Parliamentary control, the Committee of Imperial Defence. Its influence upon the Cabinet is nominally indirect, and its activities confined to the discussion of hypothetical events. But no one can doubt that its recommendations exercise a powerful effect on the executive decisions of the Government. No criticism of the advice given by the Committee is possible in Parliament. Momentous military and naval schemes are prepared there on which hang the issues of peace and war, as in the case of our recent relations to France. It is an intimate and powerful means of framing Government policy according to the ideas of military experts, without the knowledge and control of Parliament.

In the various ways indicated, opportunities of evincing an intelligent concern in its foreign policy has been increasingly withdrawn from the nation. The work of the Department escapes all outside control, loses all sense of contact with national life, and tends more and more to become an autocratic institution, contemptuous of the efforts of a small group of Members in the House to acquire information, and utilising a powerful section of the Press to mould public opinion in the direction it considers public opinion should travel.

The nation awoke with a shock to the evils of this state of affairs in the summer of 1911, when it suddenly found itself on

the very brink of war with Germany over a Franco-German quarrel about Morocco, and became cognisant of the existence of diplomatic entanglements of which it had no previous intimation.

It is obviously impossible to attempt here a full presentment of the Moroccan crisis of 1911. But the story is inseparably intertwined with the avowals to the House of Commons on August 3rd last of the secret understanding with France which has played so capital a part in bringing about British intervention in the present war.

So long as this situation prevails it must be perfectly clear to any man of ordinary intelligence that the system of Government under which we live is not a democratic system, but its antithesis. It cannot be too often insisted upon that the domestic concerns of the nation, its constitutional liberties, its social reforms, all its internal activities in short, depend upon the preservation of peaceful relations with its neighbours. War in which this country is involved is certain to prove a serious check to social progress. Hence it is a matter of absolutely vital concern to the nation that the machinery of its Foreign Office should be thoroughly capable of performing its functions, and that the policy pursued by that Department should be pursued with the knowledge and the consent of the nation. It is imperative not only that a Treaty with a foreign Power should require endorsement by Parliament, but that no agreement or understanding possessing binding force and postulating the use of the national military and naval forces should be valid without the assent of Parliament. The nation should insist upon this essential reform, and should seriously apply itself to considering what other steps are needed to ensure some mechanical means whereby a greater national control of foreign policy can be secured; whether by the establishment of a permanent Committee of the House of Commons, by the adaptation to suit our needs of the American system under which a two-thirds majority of one branch of the Legislature is required for the validity of international agreements, or other procedure. **But real and permanent reforms will not be obtained unless the nation is determined to assert its fundamental right to participate in the formation of its own foreign policy.**

III.

The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the "Balance of Power"; but shall be directed to the establishment of a Concert of Europe and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be public.

What does the "Balance of Power" mean?

It is popularly supposed to mean that no single Power or group of Powers should, in the interests of international peace, be allowed to acquire a preponderating position in Europe, and that

the policy of Great Britain should be directed against such a consummation. British policy during the past few years has been based upon the assumption that Germany had attained, or was seeking to attain, that position of eminence.

It is that idea which, in the minds of masses of our people, justifies the present war.

But if this policy has been right in the past, what prospect does the future hold? The victory of the Allies—which is a vital necessity—must enormously upset the " balance " by making Russia the dominant military power of Europe, possibly the dictator both in this Continent and in Asia.

Russia can draw upon vast resources of human military material, only partly civilised. At present she is governed by a military autocracy which is largely hostile to Western ideas of political and religious freedom. There is a hope in the minds of Western Liberals that the war may bring political liberation to Russia. At present that is only a hope. For wars have as often been a prelude to tyranny as to liberty. It is only too likely that after a victorious war our national feeling may revert to its old anti-Russian channel, and we shall again have the " Balance of Power " invoked to protect Europe and India against a new Russian pre-eminence.

Speaking generally, the " Balance of Power " is little more than a diplomatic formula made use of by the mouthpieces of the interests from whose operations war comes. It signifies nothing more than that, at a given moment, in a given country, there is an effort to hold up to the public gaze the Government and the people of another country as being intent upon the destruction of its neighbours. At one moment it is Russia, at another France, and at another Germany. The " Balance of Power " was invoked for several years and down to within a few weeks of the Crimean War to inflame British public opinion against France. It was invoked against Russia to justify the Crimean War, and France was chosen as the ally with which to fight Russia! No sooner had peace been signed than France became once more the potential threat to the " Balance of Power "; and again during the period of rivalry in West and Central Africa, and in the Far East, in the late nineties.

Once the ball has been set rolling in the required direction, influences of all kinds are brought to bear for the purpose of permanently fixing this idea in the public mind. A flood of innuendo, denunciation, and distorted information is let loose. Every dishonourable motive and the most sinister of projects are attributed to the Government and the people selected for attack. The public becomes the sport of private ambitions and interests, of personal prejudices and obscure passions, which it can neither detect nor control, and, for the most part, does not even suspect. The power for mischief wielded by these forces is to-day immense, owing to a

cheap Press and to the concentration of a large number of newspapers, possessing in the aggregate an enormous circulation, under one directing will. At the present moment the editorial and news columns of some fifty British newspapers echo the views of one man, who is thus able to superimpose in permanent fashion upon public thought the dead weight of his own prejudices or personal aims and intentions, and to exercise a potent influence upon the Government of the day.

For the last few years these newspapers have striven with unceasing pertinacity to create an atmosphere of ill-will and suspicion between Great Britain and Germany. The effort has been continuous, systematic, and magnificently organised, and inferential evidence is not lacking that it has been pursued with the approval and even with the assistance of certain official influences, and to the satisfaction of certain foreign Governments. This propaganda has had, needless to say, its counterpart in Germany. **The net result of the latest recrudescence of the "Balance of Power" policy with its Alliances and Ententes as the dominating factor in international relationships is now visible to all men. A quarrel (whose culminating episode was the murder in a Bosnian town of the heir to the Austrian throne last June) between Austria and Servia, to which the Russian Government determined to become a party, has already involved the peoples of France, Belgium, Britain, and Germany, the first three of whom were not even remotely concerned, in a terrible and desolating war.**

Japan and Montenegro have also become involved, and the same fate may overtake Holland, Italy, the other Balkan States, and the Scandinavian Powers. But for the policy of the "Balance of Power" the results of the quarrel would almost certainly have been confined to the parties immediately affected, and an early mediation by the neutral Powers would have been possible.

Bright's scathing denunciation of the fetish of the "Balance of Power" appeals with even greater force to us to-day:—

> You cannot comprehend at a thought what is meant by this balance of power. If the record could be brought before you—but it is not possible to the eye of humanity to scan the scroll upon which are recorded the sufferings which the theory of the balance of power has entailed upon this country. It rises up before me when I think of it as a ghastly phantom . . . which has loaded the nation with debt and with taxes, has sacrificed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Englishmen, has desolated the homes of millions of families, and has left us, as the great result of the profligate expenditure which it has caused, a doubled peerage at one end of the social scale, and far more than a doubled pauperism at the other.

For a system therefore which carries with it the implication that the interests of nations are necessarily in constant conflict and which involves the permanent division of Europe into two hostile competing groups, we must substitute machinery which

will facilitate co-operation and a reasonable solution of differences between all the peoples of the world.

The objective should be a real council of the nations with at first very limited powers, rather an expansion of an alliance of three Powers against three, into a league of six Powers, designed to act against any one recalcitrant member which might threaten the peace of the whole. To this ideal, indeed, the pronouncement of Mr. Asquith in his Dublin speech has already pointed, while it is noteworthy that Sir Edward Grey himself seems in a significant passage of one of his dispatches to admit the failure of the balance principle and to indicate that the nations must " start afresh " on the basis of a general council. This passage is a follows:

> If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it as far as I could through the last Balkan crisis; and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

It is from some such simple beginning, pursued with good will and perseverance by all parties, that the nations may hope to arrive at a system of co-operation to replace the system of hostile alliances, the fruits of which are the present war.

It is essential, of course, if the negotiations of such a council are to be lifted out of the atmosphere of diplomatic intrigue which the secrecy of negotiations always involves, that its deliberations be public. Publicity will at one and the same time be a guarantee of openness, of good faith, and of democratic control.

IV.

Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace settlement a plan for the drastic reduction by consent of the armaments of all the belligerent Powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the general nationalisation of the manufacture of armaments, and the control of the export of armaments by one country to another.

The theory of the " Balance of Power " and secret diplomacy are two factors which, in combination, make for war.

Two other factors intimately connected with these ensure its certainty. They are: a constant progression in expenditure upon armaments, and the toleration of a private armament interest.

It would be labour wasted to endeavour to apportion responsibility between the various European Governments for the insane competition in armaments which of recent years has attained incredible proportions. No Government can escape liability. Each Government has defended its policy on the ground that its neighbour's action compelled it to do so. Many of the governing statesmen of the world have alternately confessed their helplessness, attacked their rivals, appealed to public opinion, and blamed the warlike tendencies inherent in the people whose destinies they control. Every Government, without exception, has proceeded on the assumption that in order to ensure peace it had to be stronger than its neighbour, a philosophy which could have but one possible outcome—war. In pursuance of this phantom, a considerable proportion of the wealth of the European States has been wasted, and activities have been withdrawn from the constructive work of the world, to prepare for the world's destruction. And with every fresh outburst of expenditure, responding to some diplomatic check or alarmist propaganda, fresh faggots have been piled around Europe's powder magazine. The disaster which has fallen upon Europe is the fitting sequel to the bankruptcy of statesmanship which this policy embodies.

The more extensive the armaments, the greater the temptation to seize an opportunity for testing their efficiency; the greater the nervousness and irritation of Governments when negotiating; the greater the pressure upon those Governments of the powerful professional and other interests concerned in armament construction.

The policy of gigantic armaments cannot in the very nature of things ensure any final settlement of disputes between States. It leads, and can only lead, to an intolerable situation from which war comes to be regarded by diplomacy as the only escape.

An all-round limitation of armaments must follow the present war if the world is to be permanently relieved of the nightmare which has weighed upon it for so long. We can no longer afford to listen to arguments as to the impracticability of such a course from those whose claims to the possession of human wisdom and experienced guidance have so utterly broken down.

The difficulty of compelling a change in the policy of European Governments has been intensified by the conditions under which armament construction is carried on in this and other countries. Everyone is familiar with the fact that the object of a commercial firm is to push its wares in every legitimate manner, to advertise them, and systematically to tout for orders both at home and abroad. Everyone is aware that there exists a powerfully-equipped industry for the manufacture of military and naval engines and instruments of offence. Disguise it as we may, that industry waxes and wanes, the profits its management derives rise and fall, the dividends earned by its shareholders

increase and dwindle in the measure of the demand for the articles it produces. That demand does not emanate from members of the public. It emanates from the military and naval departments of the public services. The industry relies, therefore, for its existence and for its profits not upon a private demand, but upon a Government demand, and the extent of that Government demand will depend upon the view which the Government may take of the number and nature of these articles required to ensure the national safety. Such a condition of affairs is a permament and terrible danger both to democratic government and to international peace. What are its implications?

There is created in every country an economic force in private hands directly interested in war and in the preparation for war; directly interested in assisting to bring about a general atmosphere advantageous to an industry which, were wars to cease or the expenditure on armaments to be substantially reduced, would suffer accordingly. What the successful prosecution of an ordinary commercial undertaking requires this industry also requires. The demand for the article must be created. That basic situation engenders effects which can only be appreciated in their cumulative significance. It is not at all necessary to attribute sinister machinations to individuals. These effects are automatic. An industry disposing, as does this one, of an enormous aggregate of capital possesses almost unlimited power of influence and suggestion. For such purposes the Press is a potent instrument ready at hand. Many of those most closely associated with this great industry are men of considerable influence. Some have been in the public service and have acquaintances in the Government Departments. Others may be on friendly and perfectly honourable terms with the proprietors or editors of newspapers or associations of newspapers. The proprietor of a newspaper may be honestly convinced, or may by arguments be persuaded, that an agitation for increased armaments is advisable. If he is acquainted with one of the directors of the armament industry that acquaintance will hardly act as a deterrent to his entertaining those views. He may be furnished with special information, accurate or otherwise, as to the projects, real or alleged, of other Governments, which will be familiar to the director through his connection with Continental branches of the same industry. The Press may be utilised in a similar manner by certain permanent officials in the nation's Foreign Department, who feel that their views of the international situation can be best served by a Press campaign of a certain kind. The influence of the industry which stands to gain from the existence of these views, and the willingness of newspaper editors and proprietors to push them on to the public, cannot be expected to intervene against their propagation. Again, an ambitious

Minister, in charge of one of the fighting branches of the public service, desirous of placing his personality in the limelight and focusing public attention upon the affairs of his Department, will be from that circumstance a readier listener to representations from the industry in question. Those representations may quite legitimately take the form of pointing out that heavy expenses have been incurred in providing a certain type of machinery or special accommodation for the construction of a particular kind of offensive instrument, that the orders have not kept pace with the expenditure, and that if further orders be not forthcoming losses will ensue and future facilities for production be necessarily restricted. There would be nothing indefensible in representations of this character. And again, it is not unlikely that a Member of Parliament, convinced of certain public dangers associated with the existing system, but representing a constituency where this great industry is established and employs, perhaps, not an inconsiderable section of the local labour, may find his freedom of speech considerably curtailed lest he should be accused of taking the bread from the mouths of some of his constituents.

Endless, indeed, are the ramifications of a **private** industrial interest so wealthy and so well organised, and dependent for its profits upon **national** expenditure in instruments of warfare, and, consequently, in the ultimate resort, upon war itself. **The general influence exerted upon public life as a whole by the very fact that this industry is a private one, and possesses a large body of shareholders usually belonging to the upper strata of society, cannot be regarded otherwise than as an unhealthy and dangerous element in the nation.** Emphasis is lent to this aspect of the case when it is borne in mind that the armaments industry has of late years become internationalised to a remarkable degree. Recent disclosures, the accuracy of which has not been disputed, in Germany, France, England, and Japan have clearly shown an inter-connection of the armament interest productive of repellent accompaniments. This inter-connection of interest has, for example, made it possible for a body of British shareholders, including prominent ecclesiastics, Members of Parliament, and even Cabinet Ministers, to be financially interested in enterprises engaged in the manufacture of engines of destruction impartially used in the slaughter of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, and Russians.

But however revolting this may be, it is insignificant compared with the graver peril to which precedent allusion has been made. **Reflection must bring with it the conviction that the armament industry is not one which the nation can safely permit to be retained in private hands and to be the subject of private profit.**

What Democracy Must Do.

What, then, is to be our policy in connection with the war? First and foremost we must be victorious. That is a prime necessity upon which the nation is unanimous. We must win not only because many British institutions of the highest value would be destroyed by our defeat, not only because Prussia, our principal enemy, is the leading exponent of that doctrine of military domination and intolerance which is incompatible with a permanently peaceful Europe; but also because we must see justice done, as far as may be, to the least powerful of our Allies. **Ample compensation must be secured for Belgium to repair her material loss and in recognition of the wrong done to her.**

What of the future? What lessons do the incompetence and secretiveness, the jealousies and vanities of that vaunted European statecraft which has plunged the world in war convey to the peoples who are its victims?

What can the people do to amend a system under which they are used as pawns in a game of chess?

They can begin to understand what that system is and that its existence is their undoing. They can begin to understand the monstrous errors and fallacies which underlie the whole teaching imposed upon their intelligence. They can begin to understand that this immunity from public control enjoyed by the small group of professional men who manipulate international relations has led to the establishment amongst the latter of a standard of conduct which would not be tolerated in the ordinary affairs of a well-ordered community. They can begin to understand that "high politics" in the diplomatic world has become a synonym for intrigue; that a code of morals is therein practised which, in other branches of the public service, would entail dismissal, and in the business world would involve disgrace.

They can force themselves to a mental effort which shall lead them to the realisation of the complete artificiality of the conditions under which they suffer, the remoteness from their real and vital needs of the issues for which they are asked to sacrifice all that they hold dear. **They can rid themselves of the paralysing belief that their relations with their neighbours are so complicated and mysterious as to be beyond their comprehension. They can bring themselves to grasp a plain and demonstrable truth, and to appreciate its full significance, which is that those to whom they have looked for guidance, those who have told them that in the preservation of the "Balance of Power," and in the multiplication of colossal armaments lay the one chance of international peace, have been utterly, hopelessly, calamitously wrong. They can put to themselves these simple issues.**

"By the terrible logic of events which now confront us we see that the methods advocated by those to whose training

and wisdom we trusted to ensure peace among the nations have entirely failed. The system which we were induced reluctantly to support, far from preserving peace, has precipitated us into the greatest conflict in history, a conflict we passionately desired to avoid, and for the avoidance of which we made heavy sacrifices because, we were told, that therein lay our hope of averting it. The system was wrong. We must evolve another."

The idea of a federalised Europe, regulated by an Areopagus, involving the disappearance, or substantial reduction, of standing armies and navies, and the submission of all disputes to a Central Council, is not to be dismissed. It is the ultimate goal to aim at. But it cannot be attained until the constitutionally governed democracies of the West are brought to realise how impossible it is that their moral and spiritual development and their happiness and well-being can be secured under a system of government which leaves them at the mercy of the intrigues and imbecilities of professional diplomatists and of the ambitions of military castes; helpless, too, in the face of an enormously powerful and internationalised private interest dependent for its profits upon the maintenance of that "armed peace" which is the inevitable prelude to the carnage and futility of war.

To awaken these sentiments among the democracies of this and other countries, to instil into them these convictions, to ensure the co-operation of all forces in all countries working to that end—is the task to which we must all turn our attention.

Potentates, diplomatists, and militarists made this war. They should not be allowed to arrange unchecked and uncontrolled the terms of peace and to decide alone the conditions which will follow it. The mass of the people who suffer from their blunders and their quarrels must claim the ineradicable right of participating in the future settlement.

And, when peace has come, the democratic parties of Europe must set before themselves a new province of political effort. That peace will be permanently preserved only if our artisans and industrialists keep up with the artisans and industrialists of other countries a constant and deliberate communication through their political parties and other organisations which will prevent misunderstandings and subdue the hatreds out of which war ultimately comes.

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